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Abstract:  Evidence that local tax and expenditure limits (TELs) for public K-12 schools lower 
student achievement is widely attributed to the effects of reduced funding, but our results cast 
doubt on reduced funding as the primary explanation for negative effects of TELs in the context 
of  school-finance equalization (SFE) and instead suggest the importance of  predictable funding.  
Students in districts subject to more severe local tax limits in Oregon score less well on eighth-
grade tests in mathematics, but reduced funding is not the reason.  Our analysis expands prior 
work by accounting for the extent to which TELs are actually binding, as well as for both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary effects of TELs.  Distinguishing pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
effects allows us to document that the negative effect of TELs in Oregon is not due to reduced 
expenditures.  The state’s school-finance equalization (SFE) tends to offset funding differentials, 
so TELs have no significant effect on funding, but even if TELs did affect funding, the negative 
effect of TELs on achievement is significant even if district expenditures are held constant.  
Instead, the negative effect of more restrictive TELs appears to work by disrupting local 
planning.  We isolate this effect by distinguishing the more uncertain first year of each biennial 
budget from the second year.  Our quasi-experimental design accounts for district and year fixed 
effects, as well as for district-specific variations in expenditures and student attributes.  Results 
are robust to a placebo test to reveal spurious correlation and to several alternative specifications. 
*Earlier version presented at the Oxford Symposium on the Financing of Education (sponsored 
by the Journal of Education Finance at Oxford Union, December 2014). 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last several decades, a majority of states in the U.S. enacted tax/expenditure 
limits (TELs) that constrain funding for local governments and school districts, enacted school-
finance equalization (SFE) systems that reduce the variation in funding across school districts, or 
both.  Oregon is one of the states to enact both.1  We examine the effect of TELs on student 
achievement in the context of Oregon’s state-level SFE.2  
A number of studies, including Dye and McGuire (1997) (DM), Figlio (1997), and 
Downes and Figlio (1998) (DF), find a significant link between TELs and lower student 
achievement.  The DF evidence for the effect of TELs provides the most relevant point of 
departure for our analysis.  DF estimate the effect of TELs in the context of state-level SFEs and 
find a significant link between TELs and lower student achievement in mathematics.  In addition, 
DF suggest that that the negative effect of TELs may be due in part to non-pecuniary factors, 
such as loss of local autonomy in acquiring and directing resources to meet local needs and 
priorities.  We extend the DF analysis in two distinct ways.  First, unlike DF, we are able to 
account for the extent to which TELs are actually binding.  Second, we are able to account for 
pecuniary effects of TELs that work by reducing funding, as well as for non-pecuniary effects 
that work in other ways, apparently by disrupting local district planning.       
We apply a quasi-experimental design to data for public school districts in Oregon from 
2006 through 2011.  The design accounts for: 1) factors important in each district but common to 
every year; 2) factors important in each year but common to every district; and 3) district-level 
                                                            
1 The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1995) provides details of TELs. 
2 Origins of this paper are found in Davis and Vedder (forthcoming).  
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variations over time in student and other district attributes.  We isolate non-pecuniary effects of 
TELs by comparing estimates with and without pecuniary resources held constant and by 
exploiting the biennial budget cycle in Oregon, in which state-level SFE funding is known earlier 
and with greater certainty in the second year of the cycle than the first; we posit that in the first 
year, local tax revenues in districts with less restrictive TELs provide a buffer against the issues 
posed by the greater uncertainty of state-level SFE funding.  The estimates indicate that more 
restrictive TELs have a significantly negative effect on the percentage of eighth-grade students 
who test at or above grade level in mathematics proficiency, whether or not district expenditures 
are held constant—there is a non-pecuniary mechanism at play.  Indeed, more restrictive TELs 
have no significant effect on district expenditures, presumably due to the offsetting effects of 
SFE.  The restrictiveness of TELs is predetermined each year, but not randomly assigned, so 
estimates are potentially subject to endogeneity or other biases.  Hence, we employ the quasi-
experimental design we’ve described and probe validity using alternative specifications and a 
placebo test aimed at uncovering the possibility of spurious correlation.   
The negative effect on achievement is significant in the first year of the biennial cycle, 
and yet not significant in the second, more predictable, year.  This result suggests that the 
negative effect in the first year is related to the greater uncertainty in funding present in the first 
year and possibly, to disruptions in planning: the negative effect of compression in the first year 
dissipates by the second year, just as one would expect if the first-year effect were due to the 
kind of transitory disruption in planning suggested by anecdotal evidence.  
Our evidence confirms two key results from DF and points to a potentially problematic 
interaction between TELs and SFE that appears to work by disrupting district planning.  We 
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provide examples of specific cases and types of disrupted plans, including teacher recruitment 
and assignment, class sizes, curriculum, and scheduling. 
The following section briefly summarizes the results of other, closely-related studies.  
Section 3 outlines the evolution and key aspects of TELs and SFE in Oregon.  Section 4 explains 
the data and empirical specifications used to test our hypotheses.  Section 5 presents the 
empirical results, including robustness checks and a placebo test of their validity.  Section 6 
discusses the limitations of our results.     
 
2. Related Studies 
We noted the most closely related studies of TELs (DM, DF, and Figlio, 1997).  The 
number of other related studies is vast.  For brevity, we highlight DM, DF, and a few other 
studies of particular relevance.  Readers may wish to refer to DF for a more expansive review. 
 
2.1 Do Resources Matter? 
 Much of the existing literature examining the link between school expenditures and 
student performance finds little or no significant effect.  Prominent examples include Hanushek 
(1986, 1996) and Hoxby (2004).  Balu (2011) focuses on issues related to the funding volatility 
important to results here; and BenDavid-Hadar and Ziderman (2011) focus on methods of 
distributing funds across districts and schools. 
 
2.2 Do TELs Matter? 
 Evidence that TELs affect funding is more abundant than evidence that they affect 
achievement.  DM, DF, Dye and others (2005), and McMillen and Singell (2007) are examples 
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of studies that link TELs to reduced funding.   
Dye and others (2005) find that while TELs reduce the growth of total school-district 
expenditures, the effects do not increase over time.   
McMillen and Singell find a significant decrease in funding for states that adopted a tax 
limit between 1990 and 2000, but no increase in class size, a result they explain by suggesting 
that cuts are disproportionately small in instructional areas because instructional costs are 
relatively fixed in unionized districts.  
In addition to finding a link between TELs and funding, DF find that imposition of TELs 
in a state reduces mean student performance in mathematics and that the reduction is greater for 
poorer district areas.  DF use detailed data from the National Longitudinal Survey of the High 
School Class of 1972 and the 1992 National Educational Longitudinal Survey to control for 
demographics, and Census data to determine school district attributes and to compare 
achievement levels on reading and mathematics assessments in 1972 and 1992.  They find a 
significant decrease in mathematics scores, but no significant effect on reading scores.  
While other studies link TELs to lower expenditures and lower student performance, no 
study has estimated the link between revenue actually lost to TELs and student performance, 
as we do here.    
 
3. School Finance in Oregon 
This section summarizes key features of the complex system of TELs and SFE in 
Oregon.3  We focus only on key details central to our analysis.  
Oregon established property taxes in the mid-nineteenth century as a levy-based system 
                                                            
3 Information for this section is drawn from the Oregon Department of Education at: 
(http://www.ode.state.or.us/search/results/?id=168). 
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in which local entities set their own tax rates for schools and other local government functions 
and apply the rates to current assessed values of area properties (up to a rate of $15 per $1,000 of 
property value). 
Prior to 1991, local property taxes provided almost all of the revenues for public school 
districts in Oregon.  In that year, voters approved Measure 5, which limited property taxes for 
school operations to no more than $5 per $1,000 of a property’s assessed value, and placed 
greater responsibility on the state for funding public schools.  Hence, the state legislature enacted 
a system of school-finance equalization (SFE) that same year.  In 1997, Measure 50 placed limits 
on assessed values.  Each property's assessed value was rolled back to its 1995–96 value less 10 
percent, and growth in value was limited to 3 percent per year.  The cap on growth of assessed 
values has led to stark anomalies in the ratio of assessed to market values of various properties.  
(The appendix provides one example.)  The limitations of Measures 5 and 50, together with the 
state’s SFE, shifted the majority of school funding to the state, with roughly 70 percent of 
revenues now provided by the state.  Additional local revenues, even if approved by voters, are 
limited in two ways: by the TELs and by the state’s SFE.  With respect to TELs, property tax 
revenue is compressed by caps on tax rates and by caps on growth in assessed values.  Revenue 
not collected because of TELs is ‘compressed’ revenue, and ‘tax compression’ is the ratio of 
compressed revenue relative to the tax revenue that would be collected in the absence of the 
limits.  Tax compression provides an explicit measure of the degree to which the TELs are 
binding for each school district.  With respect to SFE, with few exceptions, the state’s SFE 
funding formula tends to offset local tax revenues.   
Oregon has a biennial budget cycle, and revenues and funding decisions are much more 
uncertain in the first year than in the second.  School districts receive preliminary SFE funding 
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estimates from the state by early summer of the first year, but these are revised numerous times 
through the legislative session and into the summer, often too late for timely hiring and 
assignments of teachers, or for setting class sizes and schedules.  Instructional plans in districts 
with little or no buffer of local funding can be disrupted—even if expenditures eventually turn 
out to be higher than anticipated.  As an example, one district transferred hundreds of teachers, 
many into classrooms in which they had little to no experience, only to transfer many of them 
back out again later in the year into jobs in which they did have experience (Owen, 2013). 
 
4. Data and Specifications 
4.1 Data Sources   
 Our data are taken from two primary sources: Oregon Department of Education reports 
on school-district budgets, demographics, and student assessments, and a report on tax 
compression rates compiled in 2013 by the League of Oregon Cities based on the Oregon 
Department of Revenue’s reports on property tax levies and collections specific to each school 
district. 
Data from these two sources yield a balanced set of complete panel data that span 
from the 2006-2007 academic year to the 2011-2012 academic year for 147 of the 192 
school districts in Oregon, for a total of 882 observations.  Data for tax compression are 
not available for 45 districts, so these districts are excluded. 
 
4.2 Mapping Years 
 Tax compression for each academic year is predetermined, hence not subject to reverse 
causality.  
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4.3 Sample Period 
 Our sample extends from 2007 to 2012.  A longer period that started prior to 1991—the 
onset of Oregon’s property tax reform—would be better, but comparable tax compression data 
are not available for earlier years.  Another complication is that state standards for eighth grade 
mathematics assessment changed over earlier years, but did not change from 2007 to 2012. 
 
4.4 Summary Statistics 
 Table 1 presents summary statistics for variables used in our analysis.  All percentages 
are expressed as percentage points.  MATH, the dependent variable, is the percentage of 
students in each district who meet or exceed state standards for eighth grade proficiency in 
mathematics based on a standardized, statewide test.  We focus on proficiency in eighth grade 
math primarily because the key result for achievement in DF is for eighth grade math, and 
secondarily because eighth grade math seems a good measure of a district’s influence: in earlier 
grades and in reading, schools have relatively less influence on student performance than family 
background, and in later grades, assessment is complicated by more specialized and diverse 
curriculum, which can range from pre-algebra math to college-level calculus.  We discuss 
empirical specifications and strategies in detail in the following section, but our set of 
independent variables includes: COMPRESSION, the ratio of tax revenues compressed by 
TELs relative to the total tax revenues that would be collected in the absence of TELs; 
EXPENDITURES, the total district operating expenditures in millions of dollars, regardless of 
source of funding; MINORITY, the percentage of students who are members of an ethnic 
minority; LUNCH, the percentage of students who qualify for a free or reduced lunch; and 
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STUDENTS, the official count of the number of students, expressed in thousands.    
     
4.5 Baseline Specification  
 Our primary hypothesis is that more restrictive TELs lower student achievement, all else 
the same.  The baseline empirical specification used to test this hypothesis is expressed by 
Equation 1. 
(1) MATHit = ci + ct + a COMPRESSIONit + B1 Dit + B2 Sit + eit  
(MATHit) is the percentage of students in district (i) in year (t) who meet or exceed eighth grade 
standards in mathematics based on a standardized, statewide test.  (ci) is an intercept for factors 
specific to each district but common to all years.  (ct) is an intercept for factors specific to each 
year but common to all districts.  COMPRESSION is the ratio of district tax revenue 
suppressed by TELs, relative to the tax revenue that would otherwise be collected, with (a) as 
the corresponding coefficient.  (D) is a vector of time-varying, district-specific variables, such 
as expenditures and enrollments, with (B1) as the corresponding vector of coefficients.  (S) is a 
vector of time-varying attributes of students in the district, such as the percentages of minority 
students or students eligible for free or reduced lunch, with (B2) as the corresponding vector of 
coefficients.  (e) is the residual error. 
 
4.6 Alternative Specifications 
Estimates of Equation 1 yield an estimate of the district-level effect of tax compression, 
but do not, on their own, identify the mechanism for the effect.  For example, a negative effect 
could arise either by reducing resources (a pecuniary effect) or by disrupting the use of resources 
in some way (a non-pecuniary effect).  We isolate these effects in several complementary ways: 
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1) by estimating the baseline equation with and without district expenditures; 2) by estimating 
whether tax compression affects district expenditures; and 3) by contrasting the baseline estimate 
for the first years of each biennium with the estimate based on the second years.  If, as we 
suspect, less restrictive TELs provide districts with a pool of local funds that serve as a buffer 
against the uncertainties of state-level SFE funding during critical phases of district planning, 
this effect should be more important in the first than in the second years of each biennium, since 
funding for the first year is typically much less certain and timely than for the second.  Estimates 
for the second years provide the opportunity for a placebo test, since a negative effect from 
disruptions due to funding uncertainty should not be present in the second years.  The importance 
of stable, predictable revenues in district planning is emphasized, for example, by Balu (2011).  
We also use a variety of alternative specifications to gauge robustness. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Baseline Model 
 Table 2 presents regression estimates of Equation 1 for the first years of each biennium.  
Again, the dependent variable is the percentage (in percentage points) of eighth grade students 
who test at or above grade level in mathematics.  Our key independent variable of interest is 
COMPRESSION, but fixed year- and district-specific intercepts are included to account for 
district-specific factors common to each year and year-specific factors common to each district; 
a number of time-varying, district-specific variables are also included as controls (number of 
students in logs, percentage of minority students and percentage of students eligible for free or 
reduced lunch).  Non-linear squared terms are also added, where significant at the ten-percent 
level or better.  However, district expenditures are not included in this initial specification, so 
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the coefficient for COMPRESSION in Table 2 reflects both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
effects of TELs.  Standard errors are robust, corrected for both heteroscedasticity and the 
clustering of multiple districts in each year. 
The overall power of the regression is high, with an R-squared value of 0.644.  The 
linear term for compression (1.67) is not significantly different from zero (p = 0.217), but the 
squared term for compression (-0.140) is significantly negative (p = 0.053), indicating that the 
effects of an increase in compression are increasingly negative as compression rises.  For 
example, the estimated decline in achievement due to compression is negligible for districts 
with low compression rates (well below 10 percent), but for districts with high compression 
rates (well over 10 percent), the estimated decline in achievement is as high as five percentage 
points.  Unlike DF, we do not find significantly more negative effects for poorer districts. 
Estimates for the other explanatory variables indicate a significant effect at traditional 
levels of significance only for MINORITYSQ (the percentage of minority students squared).  In 
this case, the coefficient (0.011) is statistically significant (p = 0.022) but small.   
 
5.2 Distinguishing Pecuniary from Non-Pecuniary Effects 
 To what extent is the negative effect of compression in Table 2 due to pecuniary effects 
working through reductions in expenditures?  To address this question, Table 3 presents 
estimates of the baseline regression, but with district expenditures held constant by including 
them as an additional regressor.4  Estimated coefficients for COMPRESSION change only 
slightly, and the negative effect for COMPRESSIONSQ remains significant (p = 0.040).  
Hence, we know that the significant negative effect is not due to pecuniary effects of changes in 
                                                            
4 Results are equivalent if both operational and capital expenditures are included. 
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expenditures.  Indeed, as is often found, expenditures have no significant effect on achievement.  
Nevertheless, we pursue the possible pecuniary effects of compression in Table 4, which 
presents estimates of the baseline regression, but with expenditures as the dependent variable 
instead of grade-level achievement in math.  Neither the coefficient for COMPRESSION nor 
COMPRESSIONSQ is significant at traditional significance levels (p = 0.89 and 0.72, 
respectively), confirming the insignificance of tax compression effects that work through 
reduced expenditures. 
 
5.3 Understanding Non-Pecuniary Effects 
 To better understand the nature of the negative (non-pecuniary) effect of tax 
compression, we rely on differences in the uncertainty of funding between the first and second 
years of the biennial cycle.  If, as we hypothesize, the negative effect of compression is due to 
the greater uncertainty of funding in the first year of each biennium, one would expect to find 
no significant negative effect in the data for second years.  Table 5 presents this placebo-effect 
estimate based on data for the second year in each biennium.  As expected, compression has no 
significant negative effect in the second-year data.  We can also rely on comparisons between 
the first and second years to understand the extent to which the negative first-year effect is 
related to a transitory disruption in planning.  While this type of transitory disruption in district 
planning could have effects that persist into the second year, one would expect the negative 
effects to diminish or disappear by the second year.  Table 6 presents the relevant estimate, 
using first-year data for compression, but second-year data for all other variables, including 
math achievement.  Consistent with interpreting the first-year negative effect as a transitory 
disruption in planning, the negative first-year effect of compression dissipates by the second 
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year, as reflected in the smaller and insignificant coefficient for first-year compression squared 
in Table 6.  Indeed, the positive coefficient for the linear compression term is now significant (p 
= 0.074). 
 
6. Limitations 
 Our analysis of the effects of TELS is subject to several limitations.  First, we are not 
able to rely on a randomized experimental design to avoid potential issues of systematic bias.  
That being impossible in this case, we instead rely on a multi-pronged strategy: 1) a well-
articulated, quasi-experimental design that controls for the influence of factors that vary by 
district but not by year, factors that vary by year but not by district, and key factors that vary by 
both district and year; and 2) our baseline estimates are subjected to several robustness checks 
and a placebo test, in which we find no significant effect for tax compression in the second years 
of the biennial data.  Another limitation is that we do not have the detailed data for district 
planning efforts to identify the direct effect of compression on disruptions to planning.  Instead, 
we infer the mechanism indirectly in several ways: by finding no effect for tax compression in 
the second, less uncertain years; by finding that the first-year effect of tax compression dissipates 
by the following year; and by interpreting the results through the lens of substantial anecdotal 
evidence of disruptions to district planning.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 Our estimates are novel in two respects.  First, they are the first to link student 
achievement to the extent to which local tax and expenditure limits actually restrict district 
revenues.  Second, they identify a significant non-pecuniary effect, which appears to work by 
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disrupting district planning.  In the context of a state-wide system of school finance 
equalization, local limits have no significant effect on district operating expenditures, but do 
appear to play a role in reducing the ability of districts to use local funds as a buffer against the 
uncertainty of state-level funding during years when that funding is less predictable.        
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Variables – Both Years of Biennia 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Min Max 
MATH* 875 65.21 13.07 14.29 95.00 
COMPRESSION*  875    2.02 2.28 0.00 16.83 
MINORITY* 875 22.94 15.11 2.30 80.59 
STUDENTS** 875 3.51 6.48 0.08 45.04 
LUNCH* 875 52.17 15.08 2.47 91.70 
EXPENDITURES*** 875 32.40 6.32 1.51 526.00 
*MATH, COMPRESSION, MINORITY, LUNCH in percentage points. 
**Student count in thousands 
***Operating expenditures in millions 
(see text for variable definitions and sources for data) 
 
 
Table 2. Baseline Math Regression for First Years 
    Obs:  437 
    R-Sq: .644 
Variable Coef. Std. Err.1            Prob 
COMPRESSION  1.67 1.35 0.217
COMPRESSIONSQ -0.14 0.07 0.053
LNSTUDENTS 10.94         11.57 0.345
MINORITY  0.04 0.38 0.913
MINORITYSQ 0.01 0.05 0.022
LUNCH   0.12 0.17 0.472
1 Robust standard errors 
(year and district binaries included in regression, but omitted from table) 
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Table 3. Baseline Math Regression for First Years Including Expenditures 
    Obs: 437 
    R-Sq: .645 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. 1           Prob 
COMPRESSION 1.78 1.33 0.182 
COMPRESSIONSQ -0.16 0.07 0.040 
LNSTUDENTS 4.14 19.03 0.828 
MINORITY 0.08 0.39 0.834 
MINORITYSQ 0.01 0.05 0.022 
LUNCH 0.11 0.16 0.504 
LNEXPENDITURES 8.55 18.88 0.651 
1 Robust standard errors 
(year and district binaries included in regression, but omitted from table) 
 
 
Table 4. Expenditure Regression for First Years 
    Obs: 441 
    R-sq: .999 
Variable Coef. Std. Err1 Prob 
COMPRESSION -0.04 0.24 0.89 
COMPRESSIONSQ -0.01 0.01 0.72 
LNSTUDENTS 7.26 1.68 0.00 
MINORITY -0.15 0.08 0.06 
MINORITYSQ 0.01 0.01 0.10 
LUNCH -0.01 0.02 0.57 
1 Robust standard errors 
(year and district binaries included in regression, but omitted from table) 
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Table 5. Baseline Math Regression for Second Years 
    Obs: 438 
    R-sq: .683 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. 1 Prob 
COMPRESSION 1.37 0.94 0.147 
COMPRESSIONSQ -0.05 0.05 0.375 
LOGSTUDENTS -2.35 10.07 0.816 
MINORITY 0.01 0.37 0.992 
MINORITYSQ 0.01 0.01 0.302 
LUNCH -0.22 0.13 0.110 
1 Robust standard errors 
(year and district binaries included in regression, but omitted from table) 
 
 
Table 6. First-Year Compression w/ Second-Year Data 
    Obs: 439 
    R-sq: .686 
Variable Coef.     Std. Err. 1 Prob 
COMPRESSION 2.15 1.20 0.074 
COMPRESSIONSQ -0.11 0.07 0.124 
LNSTUDENTS -2.92 10.08 0.772 
MINORITY 0.01 0.38 0.994 
MINORITYSQ 0.01 0.01 0.298 
LUNCH -0.21 0.13 0.128 
1 Robust standard errors 
(year and district binaries included in regression, but omitted from table) 
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Appendix 
 
The home in Portland, Oregon, pictured below—a refurbished, 4-bedroom, 3-bathroom 
Victorian home on a corner lot, just eight blocks from a popular Whole Foods grocery store—
sold on April 1 of 2014 for $490,000.  But in 1996, it was dilapidated, in the middle of a high-
crime neighborhood, and assessed at a value of just $14,030.  The new owner will pay a total of 
just $339 in property taxes in 2014, for an effective tax rate of only 0.069%.  The total tax due on 
the purchase price of $490,000 would be $7,350—more than 20 times higher. 
 
